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ABSTRACT
The cost of the current Department of Defense (DoD) defined-benefit
retirement plan has long been a source of consternation within Congress and the DoD
(Freedberg, 1999:35). Billed as being too costly in the private sector, many firms have
elected to switch from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, most often a
401K retirement plan (Chassen, 1990:18). This thesis attempts to capture the effect of
the current military retirement plan on rates of retention. The goal of this study is to be
used as a tool should the Department of Defense decide to move from a defined-benefit
plan to a defined-contribution plan. Previous studies (e.g., Asch et al., 1998) have
explored different methods in comparing various retirement systems, largely based on
organizations meeting their retention and performance goals. The model introduced in
this study will test the extent to which the rate of return associated with the current
military retirement system influences the organization’s retention goals while
simultaneously helping the individual meet his or her long-term financial security goals.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM: HOW DOES
RETIREMENT RETURN INFLUENCE RETENTION?
I. INTRODUCTION

Friedberg and Webb (2003:1) noted that defined benefit retirement plans have
become considerably less common in the United States since the early 1980s, while
defined contribution retirement plans have gained popularity. The evolution to defined
contribution plans has occurred for several reasons, including the employer’s cost
certainty offered by fixed contributions, relief from investment risk, and lower costs, both
in benefits paid out and administrative activities (Shankar and Miller, 2003:53). Like the
private-sector, the cost of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) defined-benefit retirement
plan has long been a source of consternation within Congress and the DoD’s leadership
(Freedberg, 1999:35). Asch, Johnson, and Warner (1998:48) fueled this criticism,
reporting that if DoD converted to a defined contribution plan it could reduce total
manpower costs by about 6 percent and garner an annual savings of about $2.4 billion
based on FY 1997 force levels. While DoD leadership has not been blind to these
criticisms, they have accepted the trade-offs associated with the more expensive
retirement system to help ensure proper recruiting and retention goals were met with the
all volunteer force (DoD, 1992:684), and this mindset has remained largely unchanged
since the retirement system’s inception in 1947 (Asch and Warner, 1994b:xiii). The
military retirement system functions as a strong retention tool, and a move to a defined
contribution plan could jeopardize retention efforts to maintain a stable force (Asch and
Warner, 1994a: 101).
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While the recruiting and retention goals are still cornerstones of DoD leadership,
escalating costs associated with modernization efforts and the Global War on Terror are
forcing leaders to revisit the choice regarding a retirement plan (United States Congress:
2006:294). In fact, the President has directed the 10th Quadrennial Review of Military
Compensation (QRMC), a congressionally-mandated and comprehensive review of all
military compensation, to explore changes in the military’s retirement system,
encouraging the group to evaluate a shift to a defined contribution plan (Office of the
President, 2005:1). Previous studies have focused on overhauling various retirement
systems in differing capacities (Asch, et al., 1998:2, Johnston, et al., 2001:37). Asch et al.
(1998) simulated the introduction of alternative retirement systems while simultaneously
offering a method to assess the extent to which each of those systems relate to
meaningful outcomes. The outcomes used to assess these alternatives centered on
retention rates. Johnston et al. (2001) used a Monte Carlo simulation technique to
determine the most effective defined contribution plan to meet or exceed defined benefit
plan returns.
These studies will be used as a springboard to determine the effect of the
retirement system’s return on a member’s choice to remain in the military or seek
alternative employment. As noted, studies (e.g., Asch et al., 1998) have explored
different methods in comparing various retirement systems, largely based on
organizations meeting their retention and performance goals. The model introduced in
this study will test the extent to which the rate of return associated with the current
military retirement system influences the organization’s retention goals while
simultaneously helping the individual meet his or her long-term financial security goals.
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For the defined contribution plan to represent an unambiguous improvement over a
defined benefit system, it would have to (a) lower costs, (b) satisfy retention goals, and
(c) represent an equivalent or superior benefit to individuals.
Specifically, this research will answer the following question, “How does the
retirement plan’s rate of return influence retention?” To do this, several factors thought
to contribute to retention rates will be analyzed and compared. These factors include
rank, the unemployment rate, whether the nation is at war, additional military pay
incentives, and retirement return. This study will supplement the QRMC effort by
conducting an independent analysis of the retirement system’s impact on retention rates
through the rate of return associated with the military retirement fund.
Past research has indicated defined contribution retirement plans result in lower
overall costs by the employer. If this past research holds true and can be applied to the
DoD, then savings associated with a shift to a defined contribution plan may be used
towards other modernization and transformation initiatives to ensure the DoD meets the
challenges of the future. This study (along with previous research) could serve as a
roadmap to help the DoD make the change from a defined benefit plan to a defined
contribution retirement system, if this research corroborates past research.
Definitions and Assumptions
Defined contribution plan. This retirement system is a sum of contributions that
the worker and employers made throughout a career plus the growth or contraction of the
fund over time as an investment vehicle, so that, from the worker’s perspective, the
timing of pension wealth accrual is not tied to the timing of retirement (Savych, 2005:23).
The 401K plan in industry and the Thrift Savings Plan for federal employees are types of
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defined contribution plans. This research will focus on a shift to fully relying on the
Thrift Savings Plan as the retirement system for DoD. A key characteristic of defined
contribution plans is portability. When an individual becomes vested in the defined
contribution plan with his or her company, that individual is able to take those
contributions accrued to date to another company should he or she decide to shift
employment.
Defined benefit plan. A retirement program that calculates a benefit based upon a
formula, often a percentage of final average pay times years of service (Savych, 2005:23).
The current military retirement system falls under this category, with 2.5 percent as the
multiplier applied against the average basic pay for the highest 36 months of the
individual's career.
Vesting provisions. These are provisions within a retirement plan that stipulate
how and when workers earn the right to claim their retirement benefits (Asch and Warner,
1994a:82).
This study will not address the Guard and the Reserves, only active duty military
across all of the service components. The reason for this assumption lies in the way
appropriations law separates the funding associated with Guard and Reserve forces, and
thus the implementation and management of retirement systems would be different in
these two particular force components.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this literature review is to give a history and roadmap of the
retirement system as it has evolved--both in the private sector, public sector and the
military. The military retirement system’s roles and strategic objectives will be examined,
and the challenges and criticisms of the current system will be discussed. Then a brief
examination on how the retirement system’s evolution in the private sector occurred will
take place, in order to learn key lessons to aid the transition of the military’s retirement
plan. Finally, a specific assessment of the variables affecting retention decisions (to
include the retirement system in effect) will help formulate the methodology employed in
this research project to assess the impact of the retirement system on personnel retention.
Military Compensation Goals and Objectives
A primary goal of the military compensation system is to enable the military to
meet manning objectives for force size, composition (i.e., the right mix of officers,
enlisted at the right grade and skill level), and wartime capability (Asch and Warner,
1994a:iii). This goal does not explicitly consider the idea of cost effectiveness or cost
efficiency in the area of compensation. While this indeed has been the case, the political
landscape on which these goals were built has changed dramatically over the years.
Escalating federal deficits and modernization costs coupled with the Global War on
Terror have placed dynamic stress on the federal budget in recent years (GAO, 2006:4).
The Department of Defense (DoD) has sought innovative ways to mitigate this stress; for
example, the Air Force leadership initiated a reduction in endstrength by over 35,000
airmen to fund modernization (OSD, 2005b:3). Lieutenant General Brady, Deputy Chief
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of Staff, Manpower & Personnel, stated that personnel costs have increased 51% over the
last ten years -- but number of personnel has remained relatively constant (see figure 1
below, Brady, 2006. With such a large outlay occurring each year it is not surprising the
compensation program has been a target of constant debate (Asch and Warner, 1994b:1).
A fresh look at different facets of the compensation system may be required to continue
to capitalize the force in the most cost effective manner.

Figure 1 Rising Personnel Costs

Retired pay is but one component of the overall compensation system; however,
with DoD retired pay outlays exceeding 35 billion of the 444 billion-dollar defense
budget in Fiscal Year 2005, it represents a critical piece of the system (OSD, 2005a:54).
Congress implemented the current military retirement program in 1947 to standardize a
retirement system across both the armed services and among all ranks (Asch et al,
1998:1). Although it has undergone minor adjustments, it remains largely unchanged
6

throughout its history: the system provides an immediate lifetime annuity to those who
separate with 20 or more years of active duty service, but no benefits to those who
separate with less than 20 years of service (Asch et al, 1998:1).
The purpose of retired pay in a hierarchical organization without lateral entry—
such as the DoD—is different from the purpose of retired pay in an organization with it
(Asch and Warner, 1994a:100). These organizations, like the military, groom their
leadership from within their ranks, whereas a corporation may direct hire into senior
positions and thus are not as concerned with generating turnover of older employees to
create advancement opportunities for new hires (Asch and Warner, 1994a: 101). The
retired pay system for a lateral-entry organization is designed to provide an incentive to
the right people to aspire to higher ranks while at the same time encouraging others to
leave at the right time (Asch and Warner, 1994a: 101). In short, an organization’s retired
pay system helps manage personnel flow. On the other hand, for firms that hire directly
into senior positions, retired pay is not as important as a management tool since personnel
flow is not as important. In organizations like these that do not exclusively groom from
within, retired pay is utilized to provide workers with tax-sheltered savings opportunities
(Asch and Warner, 1994a: 101). Further discussion and criticisms of the military’s
retired pay follows in the next section.
Criticisms of Retired Pay
Various critics have charged that the military’s current defined benefit retirement
system is excessively costly and unfair to taxpayers, unfair to the vast majority of
military entrants who do not serve long enough to receive retirement benefits, inefficient,
and inflexible (Asch et al, 1998:2). The first objective (excessive cost) is the thrust of
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this research paper--previous research and empirical data demonstrate the defined
contribution plan is cheaper than the current defined benefit plan (Ambachtsheer,
1999:16, Costo, 2006:60, Duchac and Goldberg, 2006:24, and Kilgour, 2006:21). The
other criticisms mentioned above are explained and addressed briefly. While there are
tradeoffs associated with both defined benefit and defined contribution retirement
systems, it is beyond the scope of this paper to compare and contrast each system. This
paper focuses on the effect the return of a retirement system on retention, thus allowing
decision-makers the ability to target the correct return rate should a transition occur in the
DoD to a defined contribution plan.
Critics charge that it is unfair for 20-year retiree to receive a lifetime retirement
annuity while others who serve for shorter periods receive nothing. The fact that only
some 30 to 40 percent of officer entrants and 10 to 15 percent of enlisted entrants stay for
a full 20-year career and receive benefits is seen to be unfair to those who receive no
benefits for their time served (Asch et al, 1998:2 and Williams, 2004:75). This critique is
largely myopic in nature, ignoring the fact that all service members are aware of the
retirement requirements upon making the decision the join the military. Even so, a shift
to a defined contribution retirement plan could mitigate this criticism, allowing members
to be vested after as little as three years of service depending on the alternative chosen.
Opponents also deem the current system inefficient, suggesting that a more “upfront” compensation system would accomplish the same recruiting and retention
objectives at a lower overall cost (Asch et al, 1998:19). The defined contribution plan
may also address this criticism by offering more of the costs while the member is on

8

active duty (via salary increase and matching contributions), thus minimizing the tail
costs involved with a defined benefit plan.
Finally, critics also charge that the current military retirement system inhibits
force management flexibility (Asch et al, 1998:3). Massachusetts Institute Technology’s
Cindy Williams (2004: 75) calls the retirement system outdated and rigid. Once a service
member achieves a certain time in service (possibly around years 10-12), then he or she is
“over the hump” and treated by organizational leadership as if he or she has an implicit
contract to year 20 (Asch et al, 1998:3). Service leaders are hesitant to force all but the
poorest performers out during this period for fear of the effect of involuntary separations
on morale (Asch et al, 1998:3). Having a defined contribution system that allows vesting
at an earlier time in service would remove this fear and allow greater flexibility in force
management, because the member would separate with the money saved in the defined
contribution plan (Asch et al, 1998:61). Table 1 below summarizes the criticisms levied
on the defined benefit plan and the proposed remedies offered under a defined
contribution system.
Table 1 Summary of Defined Benefit Criticisms and
Defined Contribution Remedies
Criticism of Defined Benefit
Excessive cost

Remedy through Defined
Contribution
Lower administrative costs and
potentially lower total cost depending on
the structure of the plan
Members eligible for benefits as early as
three years

Member receives no benefits unless
remaining with the service for 20
years
Not cost-effective with more backMore front-loaded compensation, less tail
loaded costs
costs
Inhibits force management due to 20yr Early vesting could allow for greater force
management
implicit contract
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Retirement System Evolution in the Private Sector
One need not look far in the private sector to find examples of how the retired pay
structures have changed significantly over recent history. Citing cost savings as the main
driver, large companies have moved from defined benefit to defined contribution plans,
including Alcoa, General Motors, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Lockheed Martin, and Sprint
Nextel (Geisel, 2006a:22). In 1985, 89 Fortune 100 companies offered a traditional
defined benefit plan to new employees, compared with just 37 in 2005. (Geisel, 2006b:4).
While most of these corporations may permit lateral entry, some principles behind their
transitions may prove instructive to the current study.
General Motors and Texas Instruments shifted to a defined contribution plan over
the course of several years, saving over one billion dollars in the process (Stoll, 2006:
A.10 and Pruter, 1999:34). Both companies coupled this new plan with a detailed
education system, considered to be crucial to the conversion’s success. While outside the
scope of the panel model that this research project is building, any decision to shift to a
new retirement system should give careful consideration on the need for educating the
military populace to the benefits in order to minimize potential morale problems and
uncertainty associated with a new system.
IBM announced in 2006 that it was freezing its defined benefit plan in favor of
the defined contribution system (Burr, 2006:2). Although a previous plan was somewhat
of a hybrid defined benefit and defined contribution plan, management decided to
eliminate the program in favor of an enhanced defined contribution retirement plan (Burr,
2006:3). Some of the improvements IBM provided to their employees included raising
the company’s matching percentages, raising the company default contribution rates (i.e.,
not subject to the employees even contributing to the system, and adding yearly bonuses
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to the 401 (k) plans. While the key driver in IBM’s movement to a defined contribution
plan was cost-related, the ability to make enhancements and adapt the plan quickly
demonstrates the flexibility offered by defined contribution systems.
Perceptions abound that defined benefit systems offer more substantial returns
than defined contribution systems (Kozal, 2003:41 and Calico, 2006:1). Empirical
studies such as Johnston et al. (2001:43) paint a different picture, however. Johnson et al.
demonstrate that defined contribution systems can exceed the returns of defined benefit
plans provided that the individual has a high allocation of stocks, even with the
occasional market downturn.
Key lessons from the private sector lie in two areas. The first area is the
perception of fairness associated with the defined contribution system. Proper education
and training of the features of a new retirement system is crucial to help offset any
resistance to change and false perceptions that may arise as a result of a company altering
an existing system. The panel model utilized in this study will not address this perception,
but instead focuses on the second area, the financial mechanics of the implementation.
Specifically, the ability to test whether or not the rate of return associated with a defined
contribution system is able to meet or exceed our current retention goals at a lower
overall cost.
Factors Influencing Retention
Researchers have tried to identify certain variables related to an individual
decision to voluntarily change careers, and obtaining some key drivers for the turnover
will shape the model described in the next chapter. Several studies show that
continuation rates are a useful proxy for retention efforts (Fifield, 2006:24, Kostiuk et al.,
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1988, and Shiells and Reese, 1988:2). Based upon these studies, the continuation rate
will serve as the dependent variable for this research project.
Shiells and Reese (1988:2) analyzed continuation rates of the Naval Reserve
Force by geographical area, paygrade, length of service, rating, program entry into the
Reserve, and type of ship. From this analysis paygrade and length of service were found
to have strong impact on an individual’s desire to remain in the Navy. Fullerton
conducted a study concerning pilot retention and found the economy to be a significant
factor in a member’s decision to leave the service (2003:344). Hosek et al. (2006: xvi)
found the operations tempo of the military (both home and abroad) of the military to be a
significant factor on an individual’s desire to re-enlist. From these three studies the
variables extracted to this research’s model are paygrade, the economy, and operations
tempo. Warner and Pleeter (2001) analyzed personal discount rates of the military
resulting from the drawdown beginning in 1992 and found a very high personal discount
rate in comparison to previous studies. Of particular noteworthiness in this study is how
Warner and Pleeter determined the present value of the retirement system in the form of
an annuity, which this research will attempt to replicate. The next chapter will go into
further descriptions of the variables and the methodology behind the panel model.
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the method used to build the model
conceptually introduced in Chapters 1 and 2. Data were collected on the variables to
build a cross-sectional, time-series panel model. Each variable is broken down by grade
and year for each service. This cross-sectional look over a 15-year time period is long
enough that it should be representative of times of high intensity conflict as well as times
of relative peace and lower operations tempo.
Measures
Continuation rate. The dependent variable for this model is the continuation rate
experienced by grade by year. The continuation rate defines a 'continuer' as an active
duty member who has not changed services and remains in the service at the start and end
of the year (Defense Manpower Data Center, 2006). This represents an individual
deciding to stay in the service, and thus will be used as a proxy for retention. The
Defense Manpower Data Center furnished the continuation rates by grade by year for
1990-2005.
Rank. Rank serves as an independent variable, as different decisions are faced at
different intervals throughout a military career. For example, an E-4 with 7 years time in
service will probably not have the same propensity to continue in the military than an E-7
with 17 years time in service. The grades E-1 through E-3 and O-1 through O-2 were
not analyzed in this model, as the continuation rate is nearly 100 percent in these grades.
This is due in part to members at these grades having service commitments obligating
them to stay in the service, minimizing their ability to voluntarily leave the service. Thus,
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the continuation rates would not be affected should the DoD decide to switch from a
defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan. This leaves E-4 through E-9 and O-3
though O-10 as the grades to be regressed in the model.
Unemployment rates. Unemployment rates were used as an indicator of the
overall health of the economy in terms of job availability. Previous research demonstrate
that retention rates tend to be lower during economic an uptrend where a lower
unemployment exists (Asch et. al, 2002:41 and Steel, 1996:421), and this annual
percentage rate will help control the effects of the economy on the continuation rate.
Unemployment rate data were received from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for the
years 1990-2005. The BLS does not have specific blue-collar and white-collar
unemployment rates for the entire period analyzed. Therefore, separate unemployment
rates were derived for enlisted and officer personnel, due to the differing unemployment
opportunities available for each. This was done by obtaining various unemployment
rates from the blue collar workforce and calculating an aggregate rate for the workforce
to use as a proxy for the unemployment rate for the enlisted force. The same was also
accomplished for the white collar workforce to use as an unemployment rate for the
officer corps.
Contingency operations. War is modeled as a dummy variable as a indirect
measurement for opstempo, and is coded as a “1” for the Gulf War, the conflict in Bosnia
in 1999, and the period after September 11, 2001. During periods of war, higher
operations tempo is experienced, and this will be accounted for in the model by the use of
this dummy variable.
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Higher Wage Rates. The variable entitled “additional military pay” represents the
percentage of military pay raises over and above the Employment Cost Index (ECI). The
ECI is a measure of the change in the cost of labor, free from the influence of
employment shifts among occupations and industries (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006).
The 9th QRMC (2002:40) confirmed that if the growth in military pay over the last 20
years is compared to the growth in private-sector wages (as measured by the ECI) over
that same period, results show that military pay has increased at a rate between 5.5 to
13.5 percent slower than private-sector wages. The difference between annual military
and the ECI was included in the model to help capture the effect of the increase on
retention. Both ECI data and military pay increases were obtained by the DoD Office of
the Actuary. Table 2 displays the military pay raise and resulting ECI change per year.
This average military pay raise will be used across all services and ranks equally for the
applicable year. While certain pay raises may have been targeted at specific grades, the
percentages annotated here are the across-the-board percentage increases.
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Table 2 Additional Military Pay Raises

Date of
Increase
01-01-90
01-01-91
01-01-92
01-01-93
01-01-94
01-01-95
01-01-96
01-01-97
01-01-98
01-01-99
1/01/2000 *
1/01/2001 *
1/01/2002 *
1/01/2003 *
1/01/2004 *
01-01-05
01-01-06

Mil Pay
Raise

Private Pay
Raise (ECI)

3.6%
4.1%
4.2%
3.7%
2.2%
2.6%
2.4%
3.0%
2.8%
3.6%
4.8%
3.7%
4.6%
4.1%
3.7%
3.5%
3.1%

4.1%
4.0%
3.7%
2.6%
3.1%
2.8%
2.8%
3.4%
3.9%
3.9%
3.5%
3.9%
3.8%
2.7%
3.0%
2.4%
2.6%

Delta
(ECI-Pay)
-0.5%
0.1%
0.5%
1.1%
-0.9%
-0.2%
-0.4%
-0.4%
-1.1%
-0.3%
1.3%
-0.2%
0.8%
1.4%
0.7%
1.1%
0.5%

* These across the board basic pay increases do not
include additional targeted pay increases.

Rate of Return. The final independent variable in the model is the rate of return
associated with the retirement plan. This rate of return will be expressed as a percentage
based upon the retirement system in effect. Two different methodologies were employed
to attempt to obtain a rate of retention. The first method was based upon a “retirement
simulation,” which proved to be ineffective in obtaining a proper, rational rate of return.
This methodology will be discussed briefly, and the alternative methodology adopted—
the actual yield of the Military Retirement Fund—will then be explained.
The author had planned to utilize a rate of return built upon the current defined
benefit retirement system through a series of calculations dealing with the military pay
gap. These calculations were based on a set of theoretical assumptions about the military
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pay gap difference as a substitute for the return needed to obtain the compensation
annuity paid in the form of defined benefit retirement.

A retirement simulation was

conducted to compute the amount a service member “values” the retirement system over
a higher-paying civilian job. To attempt to obtain this return, the annual pay gap between
civilian jobs and the military was computed on each rank over the course of a 20-year
career, and this amount was discounted to 2005 dollars. Then all of the years were added
up and this lump sum serves as the present value of the overall compensation annuity.
Once this amount is computed for that particular rank this would serve as the expected
present value of the stream of the retirement pay annuity. The rate of return will would
then be determined through present value analysis, using the following present value
equation solved for the rate of return:
1/n

r = (FV/PV)
where

-1

(1)

r = Rate of return
FV = Future value of the retirement plan annuity
PV = Present value of pay gap differential
n = Average number of years the annuity will be paid
The average number of years the annuity would be paid out differs for officers

and enlisted, and this is another reason for developing two separate models. The Office
of the Actuary estimated officers typically die around age 84, while the age for enlisted is
around 80. Assuming retirement at 40, this would leave the n at 44 for officers and 40
for enlisted.
Unfortunately upon conducting the retirement simulation across all the ranks in
all the services, the ensuing present value of the pay gap was too small to solve the
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annuity equation and obtain the rate of return. Typically the payback for the pay gap
occurred within the first two years of retirement, resulting in an unlimited return for the
rest of the service member’s lifetime. One could conclude that the pay gap as it is
currently measured does not adequately capture the real gap between military jobs and
their civilian counterpart, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. Because this
variable did not solve, a different proxy for rate of return was sought and found from the
DoD Office of the Actuary, the actual yield of the military retirement fund. Although
this is not the preferred measure of return, it does serve as an actual return experienced by
the retirement fund as it stands today. Table 3 shows the retirement rates of return
obtained from the Office of the Actuary used in the model.
Table 3 Military Retirement Fund (MRF) Yield
FY
MRF
1990
9.92%
1991
9.82%
1992
9.46%
1993
9.08%
1994
8.68%
1995
8.63%
1996
8.60%
1997
8.52%
1998
8.36%
1999
8.09%
2000
8.03%
2001
7.97%
2002
7.16%
2003
5.51%
2004
5.41%
2005
5.54%

Table 4 summarizes the variables associated with the model used in this analysis
Now that each variable has been described, the panel regression model chosen for this
analysis will be discussed.
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Table 4 List of Variables

Variable
Continuation Rate
Rank
Higher Wage Rates
Unemployment Rates
Contingency Operations
Rate of Return

Description
Dependent variable to be used as a proxy for retention rates
Grade of the military individual
Percentage above the ECI
Annual unemployment rate
Dummy variable to denote when the nation was at war
Proxy for defined benefit plan and defined contribution

Panel Model Regression
To fulfill the study’s primary purpose (i.e., determining the required retirement
rate of return for a defined contribution system to meet DoD retention objectives), the
testing and analysis will be conducted using a cross-sectional, time series panel model
that predicts continuation rates. Panel data, also called longitudinal data or crosssectional time series data, are data where multiple cases (people, firms, countries etc) are
observed at two or more time periods (Kennedy, 2003:301). There are two kinds of
information in cross-sectional time-series data: the cross-sectional information reflected
in the differences between subjects, and the time-series information reflected in the
changes within subjects over time. The model presented demonstrates the differences
between subjects as shown as separate grades among separate service components. The
time-series information is displayed across the 15 years of data presented in the analysis.
Panel data regression techniques allow the researcher to take advantage of these
different types of information, mainly in controlling for omitted variable bias that
sometime arises in doing ordinary least squares regression. Fixed effects regression is the
model to use when desiring to control for omitted variables that differ between cases but
are constant over time (Kennedy, 2003:302).
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The panel model proposed in this research is that continuation rates (i.e.,
retention) are a function of rank, unemployment rate, war, additional military pay, and
retirement return such that:

Continuation Rate% = f { α + β0Rank+ β1Unemployem
ent Rate+ β2AdditionalPay + β3 War+ β4 ReturnRate+ εit

}

(2)

The fixed-effects panel model notation is:
yit = α + xit β + ε it
where

(3)

i = {Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines}
t = {1990,1991,…2005}
β = The vector of coefficients
xit = The vector of regressors (listed in Table 4)

ε

= Error term

α

= Constant

Different diagnostic tests will be conducted to ensure each model (one for officer
and one for enlisted) has appropriate explanatory power. Once the panel model is run
and the coefficients estimated for the significant variables, this could form the basis for
the change to a defined contribution plan. Policy implications, such as shifting to a
defined contribution plan and potential challenges associated with such a move, will be
addressed in chapters four and five.
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to explain the processes that were undertaken to
analyze the data and models discussed in earlier chapters. As stated previously, two
models were constructed to allow for differences experienced in officer and enlisted
ranks. Common statistical methods applied to the models--both pre-estimation and postestimation--will be briefly discussed. Then each of the models will be evaluated
independently in terms of execution and results.

Pre-Estimation Tests
The data was first tested for stationarity using the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF)
and similar unit root tests. Stationarity exists when the statistical properties of the
variables do not change over time (Kennedy, 2003:324). In time series, interpretation
from analysis that uses non-stationary data can lead to spurious results and erroneous
conclusions regarding relationships among the variables (Kennedy, 2003:319). All
datasets used in this research were found to be stationary in nature. 1 The tests employed
to determine if a variable has a unit root (and thus is stationary) can be found at Appendix
A.
The Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) was reviewed for several different
preliminary regressions based on varying lag lengths of the variables and autoregressive
(AR) specifications. The AIC is a popular way of determining the goodness of fit of the
model while maintaining parsimony (Kennedy, 2003:117). Smaller AICs indicate better
1

Of the three tests employed to determine stationarity, one (the Hadri Z stat) showed partial stationarity,
and full results can be found at Appendix A
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fitting models, in conjunction with maximizing the adjusted R-squared. For the enlisted
model the optimal lag for this analysis was determined to be a one-year lag accompanied
with 2 AR specifications. This one-lag, 2-AR model yielded an AIC 4.29 while
simultaneously achieving an adjusted R-squared of over .99. The lag length for the
officer model proved to be the most effective at a 2-year lag accompanied with 2 AR
specifications. This would indicate that officers may contemplate whether or not to
leave the service for a longer period of time before actually leaving the service as
opposed to the 1-year lag in the enlisted model.
Post-Estimation Tests
To determine independence of the residuals in each model, the Durbin-Watson
(DW) test statistic was calculated. Not to have independence of the residuals could result
in autocorrelation and jeopardize the findings. Autocorrelation can be corrected by
adding an autoregressive (AR) specification term to the model estimates. In each of the
models an AR term was added as determined from the analysis of the AIC discussed
above. The enlisted model DW statistic was computed at 2.07 while the officer model
measured 1.96. Further detail of the Durbin-Watson results are shown in the applicable
appendix for the panel models.

With all the model specifications computed and

validated, the results will now be discussed and each model examined independently of
one another.
Enlisted Model Results
Table 5 summarizes the results of the enlisted model. The grades studied began at
E-5 and went through E-9 from all service components (Air Force, Army, Navy, and
Marines). A total of 264 balanced observations were analyzed over a 15-year period. As
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previously discussed, the type of analysis conducted was a panel model with one year
lags on the independent variables as well as two autoregressive specifications included in
the regression. Interesting to note that in this model only two variables were found to be
statistically significant--the rate of return associated with the retirement plan and whether
or not a contingency operation was in effect. Additional pay over and above the ECI and
the unemployment rate were both significant to the 13 percent and 16 percent,
respectively, so these variables just missed significance. With an adjusted R-squared of
0.9942 this model explains the majority of the variation in continuation rates, and with a
Durbin Watson measure of 2.07 autocorrelation is not present. Each of the significant
variables will be briefly discussed. Full results of the panel model can be found at
Appendix B.
Table 5 Enlisted Panel Model Results

Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

RETURN(-1)**
44.62417
2.56994
WAR(-1)***
1.344739
4.45990
ADDPAY(-1)
27.75447
1.52833
UNEMP(-1)
-0.194100
-1.40436
AR(1)
0.168055
3.02054
AR(2)
0.073566
1.34192
R-squared
0.994718 Akaike info criterion
Adjusted R-squared
0.994153 Schwarz criterion
Durbin-Watson stat
2.078899
***significant to the 0.001 level, **0.05 level, *0.10 level

Prob.
0.0108
0.0000
0.1278
0.1615
0.0028
0.1809
4.29468
4.65075

Rate of Return. The rate of return was found to be significant to the .011 level,
and the magnitude was the highest of any variable in the model (significant or otherwise).
With a positive coefficient, this would mean that as rate of return of the retirement plan
increases an individual would have a greater propensity to remain in the military. This
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intuitively makes sense as one would expect higher rates of return to increase
continuation rates within the military.
Contingency Operations. Whether or not the nation was involved in contingency
operations had the most significance in the model, but very little magnitude associated
with it. This indicates that high operations tempo may weigh heavily on an individual’s
mind on whether or not to remain in the military, but may not be heavily acted upon in
the end.
While the enlisted model gave results that were expected, the officer model
discussion that follows shows that two separate models were indeed needed to adequately
describe the differing patterns associated between the two groups of people.
Officer Model Results
Table 6 summarizes the officer panel model. The grades that were examined
began at O-3 and went through O-10 from all service components (Air Force, Army,
Navy, and Marines). A total of 384 balanced observations were analyzed over a 15-year
period. This model did not prove to have the power of the enlisted model, as the
diagnostic tests show with an adjusted R-squared of 0.4769 and Durbin Watson 1.96.
The measures prove to vary greatly from those of the enlisted model, and judging from
the vast differences in results one can conclude that the officer model fails to account for
the majority of the decisions affecting whether or not one chooses to remain in the
military or seek alternative employment. The significant variables will again be
discussed as was done in the enlisted model, but in light of the overall officer results the
policy implications available to decision makers will be limited. Again only two
variables were found to have significance, those being rate of return and unemployment
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rate. Contingency operations had almost no significance (possibly because far fewer
officers in the Army and Marines deploy compared to enlisted, and Air Force pilots are
already well compensated), and additional pay was significant to the .2479 level. Full
results of the officer model can be found at Appendix C.
Table 6 Officer Panel Model Results

Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

RETURN(-2)**
-95.3190
-2.11479
WAR(-2)
-0.1158
-0.10515
ADDPAY(-2)
69.1032
1.15736
UNEMP(-2)**
-1.7884
-3.01797
AR(1)
-0.3683
-6.77737
AR(2)
-0.2106
-3.83405
R-squared
0.527423 Akaike info criterion
Adjusted R-squared
0.476887 Schwarz criterion
Durbin-Watson stat
1.956114
***significant to the 0.001 level, **0.05 level, *0.10 level

Prob.
0.0352
0.9163
0.2479
0.0027
0.0000
0.0001
7.00445
7.39540

Rate of Return. Once again, the rate of return was found to have the most
magnitude of any variable. However, in the officer model the coefficient was negative,
which was not expected. This would indicate that as the rate of return increases, the
desire to separate from the service would increase. A possible explanation of this result
is that the rate of return was lower than expected, causing the officer to seek employment
alternatives. Still another explanation may be that Military Retirement Fund is not as
good as proxy for rate of return for officers as it is for enlisted. Finally, the rate of return
variable being negative may simply show that something else (in addition to the
retirement plan’s rate of return) may have an effect on the officer’s retention decision,
something that is not currently captured in the model (more on this in the following
section).
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Unemployment Rate. The unemployment rate was the most significant variable
in the officer model with a measure of 0.0027. This indicates that the state of the
economy and the job picture is much more important to the officer making a decision on
whether to separate more so than the enlisted. The coefficient is negative, indicating that
when the unemployment rate increases, retention decreases, which again is counterintuitive to what one would expect. This may be explained by a “patriotic” or “calling”
variable that is extremely hard (if not impossible) to measure. Another possible
explanation is that members of the officer corps may separate for reasons other than the
general economy (e.g., family separations and deployments). Again, the low adjusted Rsquared makes it apparent that something is missing from this model. The way the
officer is supposed to view his or her position as a “calling” versus a “job” may explain
why not only the unemployment rate coefficient is negative, but also why it has very little
magnitude on one’s decision to remain in the service.
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V. CONCLUSION

This chapter will address the overall findings of the analysis and provide an
overall assessment of the research conducted in light of potential policy implications.
Tying the previous chapters together will help provide some potential action areas by
decision makers. Finally, this chapter will offer suggestions for future research in the
context of military retirement analysis in general and defined contribution plans in
particular.
Overall Summary and Implications
While numerous studies have been conducted on the military retirement system
and offered a plethora of alternative ideas to our current defined benefit retirement
system, none up to this point had given a target return rate for the alternative program to
achieve in order to maintain our current retention levels. From the outset this research
attempted to find the effect that the retirement plan’s rate of return had on retention levels
so as to bridge the gap between past research and the eventual transition to a defined
contribution system that many decision makers believe is inevitable. Making a blind
overhaul of our current retirement system without fully counting the costs of such a move
could prove disastrous results to our readiness levels, and DoD leadership should weigh
on the potential cost-saving benefits in light of the pitfalls that exist and have been
discussed in previous research. This research adds yet another building block to the
process, and the author believes several areas of future research may shed even more
light on the potential to save money while simultaneously maintaining individual goals
and personnel readiness of our nation’s military.
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The research was built around the following question, “How does the retirement
plan’s rate of return influence retention?” Through panel regression analysis it was found
that the retirement plan’s rate of return does influence a member’s decision on whether or
not to remain in the military or seek alternative employment. By separating officers from
the enlisted force it was expected to better capture the nuances associated with each
group. This proved to be a correct method as the enlisted model explained retention rates
to a strong degree of accuracy. The officer model did not experience the same goodness
of fit, and as previously mentioned this shows that the model was not complete in
assessing all of the criteria an officer evaluates before making a decision to remain in the
service or separate and find another job.
The greatest potential in the thesis lies in capturing the rate of return of our
current retirement system. The author attempted to capture this through present value
analysis of the pay gap between the military and civilian sectors and using this as a proxy
for return of the retirement system over the life of a career military member. This
calculation was attempted by conducting a retirement simulation of applicable ranks from
1990-2005 and using the cumulative pay gap as the future value of an annuity due.
However, the pay gap as currently measured did not result in a high enough dollar
amount to solve the rate of return equation, suggesting an infinite return.
As discussed, the enlisted model proved to have greater statistical power and
stronger diagnostic tests, and overall, the goodness of fit is much better in this model than
the officer model. Given that the officer model’s adjusted R-squared is almost half of
the enlisted, one may reasonably conclude that there is some decision criteria not
captured in the officer model. The author has attempted to explain the missing
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characteristic as some sort of “patriotic” factor or “calling” aspect of the military officer
that may not be as heavily prevalent in the enlisted force. The current environment of the
political and military leadership continues to transform our armed forces to a business
mindset and less of a calling. As this mindset gains footing in the officer corps, the
author believes that the officer model will behave closer to the enlisted model, as the
somewhat intangible “calling” aspect gives way the business viewpoint.
The rate of return variable showed the greatest magnitude in both models, finding
strong significance as well. This variable was lagged one year in the enlisted model;
demonstrating enlisted members tend to think about separating decisions a year prior to
actually making the choice. The only other significant variable in the enlisted model was
the contingency variable (also lagged one year), meaning that members do take into
consideration whether or not the nation is at war (i.e., experiencing higher operations
tempo) when determining to stay in or get out of the military. Additional pay above the
ECI and the state of the economy as shown in the unemployment rate did not statistically
affect one’s retention decision. Both variables did just miss significance, however, and
the magnitude of the additional pay was second only to the rate of return of the retirement
plan. This research does not show that these variables simply don’t matter, rather that the
other two variables have a greater impact on the member’s retention decision.
While the officer model did not have the same intuitive results, a noteworthy
result from the analysis is the significance of the rate of return variable. While not
effectively capturing the variation involved in an officer’s desire to remain in the military
or seek alternative employment, this research has laid the groundwork for future
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endeavors to model officer behaviors in the same vein that enlisted attitudes have been
analyzed.
Suggestions for Further Research
The potential for further research in this area is far-reaching as the retirement
debate rages on in academic circles. As discussed in the literature review, the private
sector has made a significant transition from the traditional defined benefit retirement
system to that of a defined contribution system. The author believes that the DoD will
eventually adopt a similar program for the military population citing the same rationale as
the private sector, that of cost savings. The research conducted in this paper is the first
step towards achieving the goal of a cost-effective plan while not eroding the military
member’s benefit scheme. The next step is to take the results of this thesis and develop
different defined contribution plans that achieve the same rate of return results and thus
maintain our present retention rates. Evaluating defined contribution alternatives in light
of their potential effects on retention rates will allow decision makers to develop more
enlightened and robust set of action steps if the defined contribution plan is ever
implemented as DoD’s sole military retirement vehicle. Each of the alternatives
discussed should not neglect the implementation scheme associated with the plans, as
past records indicate that training and education during the transition is essential to any
program’s success (and thus retention levels remaining stable).
Another area for further research lies in fine-tuning the rate of return variable.
More research is needed to determine if the Military Retirement Fund yield is the best
proxy available for our retirement system. While the author attempted to find another
variable, time constraints and data availability prevented an exhaustive search. A more
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rigorous variable could help achieve better results in the officer model, which proved to
be the greatest area for improvement in this research.
This leads to the final area recommended for further research; the development of
an officer model with the same explanatory power then that of the enlisted force. The
“patriotic” factor or “calling” aspect is indeed an elusive variable that could have
extensive impact on the results if modeled correctly. Additional variables may also need
to be considered, such as public opinion of the military, stressed career fields that deploy
more than others, or the addition of the Thrift Savings Plan as an investment vehicle.
Conclusion
This research investigated the effect that the defined benefit retirement system has
on retention rates in the armed forces. Clearly the retirement benefits experienced in the
military have an effect on an individual’s desire to remain in the service or shift to the
private sector. The research conducted in this endeavor is a positive step forward in
determining the proper steps to modify the retirement system and mitigate the negative
effects of that modification. This research effort expanded the current knowledge base of
military retirement analysis through regressing the various decision criteria that go into
the final decision to remain or leave the military and finding the magnitude of the
retirement’s rate of return on that decision. Decision makers at the highest levels should
utilize this additional knowledge on the backdrop of previous research should the
transition of the current retirement system come to fruition. Adding to the current
inventory of knowledge will help aid the DoD leadership make an informed, accurate,
and defendable decision in achieving retention goals that benefit the nation (lower costs)
and the individual (proper return rate).
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APPENDIX A—Unit Root Test for Stationarity

Group unit root test: Summary Enlisted
Date: 12/16/06 Time: 19:35
Sample: 1990 2005
Series: Continuation Rate
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic selection of lags based on AIC: 0 to 3
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel
Method
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
Breitung t-stat
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
PP - Fisher Chi-square

Statistic

Prob.**

Crosssections

Obs

-7.28323
-3.23465

0
0.0006

18
18

250
232

-6.13409
112.302
116.265

0
0
0

18
18
18

250
250
270

0.0005

20

320

Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Hadri Z-stat
3.31877
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.
Group unit root test: Summary Officer
Date: 12/16/06 Time: 19:30
Sample: 1990 2005
Series: Continuation Rate
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic selection of lags based on AIC: 0 to 3
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel
Method
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Levin, Lin & Chu t*
Breitung t-stat
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat
ADF - Fisher Chi-square
PP - Fisher Chi-square
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)
Hadri Z-stat
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi
-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.

Statistic

Prob.**

Crosssections

Obs

-12.9781
-7.87877

0.00000
0.00000

32
32

463
431

-10.9514
238.649
289.299

0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

32
32
32

463
463
480

8.3985

0.00000

32

512
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APPENDIX B – Full Enlisted Panel Model Results
Dependent Variable: ?_CONT
Method: Pooled Least Squares
Date: 12/15/06 Time: 15:23
Sample (adjusted): 1993 2005
Included observations: 13 after adjustments
Cross-sections included: 20
Total pool (balanced) observations: 260
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations
Variable

Coefficient

Constant
RETURN(-1)
WAR(-1)
ADDPAY(-1)
UNEMP(-1)
AR(1)
AR(2)

73.2954
44.62417
1.344739
27.75447
-0.1941
0.168055
0.073566

E5USAF--C
E6USAF--C
E7USAF--C
E8USAF--C
E9USAF--C
E5USA--C
E6USA--C
E7USA--C
E8USA--C
E9USA--C
E5USN--C
E6USN--C
E7USN--C
E8USN--C
E9USN--C
E5USMC--C
E6USMC--C
E7USMC--C
E8USMC--C
E9USMC--C

16.54878
15.31008
6.777748
5.729094
2.49296
9.20632
-76.16029
-76.16029
3.567072
5.313725
12.15547
12.32569
10.70866
6.213733
4.669771
5.488899
14.78406
11.86491
5.171949
3.991682

Effects Specification
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

0.994718
0.994153
1.976011
913.6814
-532.3081
2.078899

Std. Error t-Statistic

Prob.

1.76676
17.3639
0.301518
18.15997
0.138212
0.055637
0.054822

0
0.0108
0
0.1278
0.1615
0.0028
0.1809

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

41.48578
2.569939
4.459895
1.528333
-1.40436
3.020542
1.341917

76.15115
25.84255
4.294677
4.650746
1762.591
0
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APPENDIX C – Full Officer Panel Model Results
D e p e n d e n t V a ria b le : ? _ C O N T
M e th o d : P o o le d L e a s t S q u a re s
D a te : 1 2 /1 5 /0 6 T im e : 1 5 :1 0
S a m p le ( a d j u s te d ) : 1 9 9 4 2 0 0 5
In c lu d e d o b s e r v a tio n s : 1 2 a f te r a d j u s tm e n ts
C ro s s -s e c tio n s in c lu d e d : 3 2
T o ta l p o o l ( b a la n c e d ) o b s e r v a tio n s : 3 8 4
C o n v e r g e n c e a c h ie v e d a f te r 6 ite ra tio n s
V a r ia b le
C
? _ A D D P A Y ( -2 )
W A R ( -2 )
U N E M P ( -2 )
R E T U R N (-2 )
A R (1 )
A R (2 )
O 3 U S A F --C
O 4 U S A F --C
O 5 U S A F --C
O 6 U S A F --C
O 7 U S A F --C
O 8 U S A F --C
O 9 U S A F --C
O 1 0 U S A F --C
O 3 U S A --C
O 4 U S A --C
O 5 U S A --C
O 6 U S A --C
O 7 U S A --C
O 8 U S A --C
O 9 U S A --C
O 1 0 U S A --C
O 3 U S N --C
O 4 U S N --C
O 5 U S N --C
O 6 U S N --C
O 7 U S N --C
O 8 U S N --C
O 9 U S N --C
O 1 0 U S N --C
O 3 U S M C --C
O 4 U S M C --C
O 5 U S M C --C
O 6 U S M C --C
O 7 U S M C --C
O 8 U S M C --C
O 9 U S M C --C
O 1 0 U S M C --C

C o e f fic ie n t
9 8 .2 5 4 0 2
6 9 .1 0 3 2 1
-0 .1 1 5 7 5 4
-1 .7 8 8 3 8 3
-9 5 .3 1 9 0 4
-0 .3 6 8 2 5 7
-0 .2 1 0 6 3 7
7 .1 6 7 2 5 1
6 .2 5 0 5 9 3
3 .6 4 1 9 9 5
-1 .1 3 9 1 6
4 .6 0 5 2 8 9
-1 .1 9 4 4
-7 .8 1 7 1 9 3
-8 .6 4 4 6 9 1
5 .8 6 7 5 4 5
7 .8 3 1 9 6 8
4 .0 2 2 2 1 5
-0 .9 0 1 9 1 9
6 .1 5 8 9 6 4
-2 .0 3 9 9 5 6
-1 0 .3 5 1 4 7
-1 1 .1 9 1 6 3
4 .0 1 3 9 2 9
6 .0 6 4 4 9 5
5 .6 1 9 7 6 9
0 .4 5 8 3 8 1
4 .5 1 6 1 3 9
-7 .6 7 0 4 9 1
-8 .4 3 5 0 5 4
-1 3 .1 0 0 1 2
5 .7 0 6 9 9
8 .1 9 8 1 0 3
4 .1 4 4 4 8 1
0 .9 7 8 3 6 8
9 .6 3 1 6 7 9
-1 .4 3 3 6 9
-5 .3 0 6 2 8 4
-1 5 .6 5 2 1

E ff e c ts S p e c if ic a tio n
C ro s s -s e c tio n f ix e d (d u m m y v a r ia b le s )
R -s q u a r e d
A d j u s te d R -s q u a r e d
S .E . o f r e g r e s s io n
S u m s q u a r e d r e s id
L o g lik e lih o o d
D u r b in -W a ts o n s ta t

0 .5 2 7 4 2 3
0 .4 7 6 8 8 7
7 .6 6 3 2 0 4
2 0 3 1 8 .7 5
-1 3 0 6 .8 5 4
1 .9 5 6 1 1 4

S td . E r ro r
3 .8 2 5 1 2 3
5 9 .7 0 7 7 1
1 .1 0 0 8 4 9
0 .5 9 2 5 7 8
4 5 .0 7 2 5 5
0 .0 5 4 3 3 6
0 .0 5 4 9 3 9

t-S ta tis tic
2 5 .6 8 6 5
1 .1 5 7 3 5 8
-0 .1 0 5 1 5
-3 .0 1 7 9 7 3
-2 .1 1 4 7 9 1
-6 .7 7 7 3 6 5
-3 .8 3 4 0 4 7

M ean dependent var
S .D . d e p e n d e n t v a r
A k a ik e in f o c r ite r io n
S c h w a r z c r ite r io n
F -s ta tis tic
P r o b ( F -s ta tis tic )

P ro b .
0
0 .2 4 7 9
0 .9 1 6 3
0 .0 0 2 7
0 .0 3 5 2
0
0 .0 0 0 1

8 4 .0 8 9 8 4
1 0 .5 9 5 2 9
7 .0 0 4 4 5
7 .3 9 5 3 9 9
1 0 .4 3 6 6 4
0
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